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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**
THE SMALL BUSINESS
INVESTMENT COMPANY: POWER
OF FEDERAL INJUNCTION VS.
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

When a business seems to be
tottering on the rocks, its chief
operating officer often considers
chapter 11 as a safe harbor for
rehabilitating the company back
ta financial health. Other alternatives for saving the business also
may be explored, thus delaying
the decision to seek relief under the Bankruptcy Code. When
honbankruptcy alternatives are
considered but found to be unattractive or ineffective, chapter 11
relief may seem even more inviting. However, the delay may frustrate the chief operating officer's
quest for reorganization when an
event such as the appointment of
a temporary receiver by a federal d,istrict court intervenes. This
scenario seems to have been
played out in United States v.

* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; Counsel to the Jaw fir'm of
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Kadin &
Peddy, Garden City, New York; member
of the National Bankruptcy Conference.

Vanguard Investment Company,
Inc. 1
Vanguard was licensed in 1970
by the Small Business Administration· (SBA) as a small business
investment company (SBIC) under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. 2 In accordance
with statutory authority, between
1974 and 1979 the SBA purchased
from Vanguard $500,000 worth of
preferred stock, .as well as subordinated debentures in the face
amount of $1,270,000.
TRO and Temporary Receivership
However, on June 11, 1987, the
SBA commenced an action against
Vanguard in a federal district
court in North Carolina alleging
that the SBIC committed several
regulatory violations and thus
should be dissolved and liquidated. On the same day the SBA
applied for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction,
and temporary receivership. On
June 16, the district court held a
hearing on the motion and entered
a temporary restraining order
and appointed a temporary receiver. "The June 16, 1987, Order
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667 F. Supp. 257 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
See 15 u.s.c. § 68l(d).
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brought Vanguard under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
and ended the authority of Vanguard's directors, officers, employees, and agents to act on behalf of Vanguard." 3 The parties
stipulated that the order would be
effective until the preliminary injunction matter was heard and
ruled on.
Prior to the hearing on the preliminary injunction, but approximately three weeks after the June
16 order, the president of Vanguard filed a chapter 11 petition on
behalf of the corporation without
seeking leave of the district court.
However, the filing of the chapter
11 petition did not deter the district court from proceeding with
the hearing on the preliminary injunction notwithstanding the automatic stay provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code enjoining actions against the debtor. 4

of Vanguard and suspended the
authority of all directors, officers
and employees to act on its behalf. A temporary receiver was
given all authority to act for Vanguard for the purpose of conserving and preserving its assets. The
courtjustified the issuance of such
a broad order by citing the Small
Business Investment Company
Act section that provides that the
court "may, to such extent as it
deems necessary, take exclusive
jurisdiction of the licensee. " 6 Accordingly, the president had no
authority to file a chapter 11 petition on behalf of Vanguard after
June 16 and "his actions were null
and void, being without legal effect.'' 7 The court did not hold that
the appointment of a temporary
receiver rendered a company ineligible- for bankruptcy relief.
However, quoting from Commodity Futures Trading Co. v. FITC,
Inc., 8 the court observed:

Chapter 11 Petition Was a Nullity

Once a court appoints a receiver,
the management loses the power to
run the corporation's affairs. The
receiver obtains all the corporation's power and assets .... Thus,
it was the receiver, and only the
receiver, who this Court empowered with the authority to place [the
debtor] in bankruptcy. 9

The court's reasoning was predicated on the finding that "actions by any of the suspended directors, offieers, or employees
purporting to put Vanguard into
bankruptcy were a nullity; and
therefore, did not invoke the automatic stay provisions of 11
U.S.C. section 362." 5 The court
noted that in its June 16 order, the
court took exclusive jurisdiction

The court in Vanguard also
cited dicta of the Court of Appeals
6

15 U.S.C. § 687c(b).
667 F. Supp. at 259.
52 Bankr. 935, 937-938 (N.D. Cal.
1985).
9 667 F. Supp. at 259-260.
7

3

667 F. Supp. at 259.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
s 667 F. Supp. at 259.
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for the Ninth Circuit, indicating
that leave of the court is required
for a corporation to file a bankruptcy petition in the face of a
stay issued as part of a temporary
restraining order and appointmeiJ.t
of a temporary receiver. 10
What Should Company Have
Done?
What course should the company have taken under the circumstances? The district court
answered this question by suggesting that "Vanguard should
have moved this Court for leave
to file a bankruptcy petition.'' 1 1
The court then could have considered "whether Vanguard was entitled to file a bankruptcy petition
as a matter of right and whether
such petition should be allowed as
a mafter of equitable discretion." 12 By referring to equitable
discretion, the court apparently
was relying on the language in
Commodity Futures Trading Co.
v. FITC, Inc., 13 indicating that
while not a common occurrence, a
court may preclude bankruptcy
relief if compelling circumstances
exist. Nonetheless, having acted
without authority and in violation
of the receivership and temporary
restraining order, Vanguard's purported cl).apter 11 petition was
10
See SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass'n, 577
F.2d 600, 604 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978).
11
667 F. Supp. at 260.

without legal effect and the court
did not have to consider whether
bankruptcy relief should be available under the circumstances.
Another Approach
The court in Vanguard noted
that its conclusion would have
been the same under a different
analytical approach used by the
Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in a similar case. In UniJed
States v. Royal Business Funds
Corp., 14 the SBA and a SBIC
were involved in a dispute and, as
a result, the court issued a restraining order. The SBA was appointed as receiver and the SBIC
subsequently filed a bankruptcy
petition without leave of the
court. However, the court in
Royal did not face the issue
whether the bankruptcy petition
was null and void as a procedural
matter because of the receivership. "Instead the court implied
that the procedural validity of the
petition filed without leave and in
violation of the restraining order
is determined by whether the
SBlC has the substantive right to
enter bankruptcy." 1 s
. Although in Royal the court
recognized the general rule that
the pendency of an equitable receivership rarely precludes a
bankruptcy petition, and that an
SBIC receivership is governed by

l2Jd.
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52 Bankr. 935 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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724 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1983).
667 F. Supp. at 260.
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principles applicable to federal receivers generally; nonetheless "a
debtor subject to a federal receivership has no absolute right to file
a bankruptcy petition . . . . " 16 In
Royal, the court disallowed the
petition based on the circumstances of the case: there were no
significant creditors other than the
SBA; the debtor consented toreceivership leading to further investment by the SBA; the receiver operated the SBIC for
more than a year; the petition was
filed by the debtar and rtot creditors; and the debtor offered no
reasons justifying the p-etition.
Factual Basis of Decision

Applying the Royal approach,
the court in V art&uard concluded
that the factual citcumstances
similarly compelled disallowance
of Vanguard's ,purported bankruptcy petition. At the June 16
hearing, Vanguard did not even
mention its desire to file a chapter
11 petition although it had known
for at least three Y.e'ats that it was
in liquidation status with the SBA ..
Va:nguard filed the petition, not
creditors. The SBA was Van•
guard's only significant creditor. Moreover, the SBA showed
that Vanguard violated several
SBIC regulations. The court also
pointed out that the receiver
would be under court supervision
and that all parties' rights would

be protected. "Vanguard has not
pointed to any sp~cific reasons
why under the facts of this case, a
proceeding in bankruptcy would
be fairer or more efficient either to
itself or to creditors, than a receivership.' ' 17
Vpon disregarding Vanguard's
chapter 11 petition, the court
turned to the merits of the SBA's
motion for preliminary equitable
relief. The court held that the
statutory requirements for a prelimimtry injunction and temporary
recei-vership had been met. Vanguard had violated several regulations regarding capital impairment, failure to make interest
payments, and failure to m~et
financial reporting requirements.
"Given the nature of Vanguard's
regulatory violations and SBA's
long-standing attempts to resolve
them, the Court believes it must
continue to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over Vanguard and
maintain the SBA as temporary
teceiver.'' 18
Conclusion

Prudent directors and officers
will consider carefully all alternatives to the filing of a chapter 11
petition with the hoJ1e of selecting
the most feasible and appropriate avenue for business rehabilitation. However, such delay in

17

16

724 F.2d at 16.
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667 F. Supp. at 261.
·

!d. at 263.
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reaching a decision regarding 'the pending on the particular circumfiling of a chapter 11 petition could stances of the case, federal ceurts
become detrimental if a federal have disallowed such petitions
equitable receivership is ordered purportedly filed on behalf of the
before the filing. This danger is debtor. As indicated in Vanguard,
most significant in regulated in- a federal equitable receivership
dustries governed by federal stat- deprives the directors and officers
utes that provide for receiverships of the debtor of the power to file a
such as the Small Business In- chapter 11 petition on behalf of
vestment Act of 1954. Although a the company without first moving
receivership does not, in and of for leave of the district court to
itself, preclude bankruptcy relief, file the petition. Based on Vana debtor subject to a federal re- guard' and on the Royal method of
ceivership has no absolute right to analysis, such leave will not be
file a bankruptcy petition and, de- granted automatically.
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